(BRUSSELS) — It used to be simple. On the one hand were the people decidedly in favor of a union of European states: They remembered the suffering of the two World Wars, mainly fought in Europe, and were keenly aware of what the founding fathers of the Economic Community had been longing for: never again would such dreadful conflicts tear Europe apart. They had a dream of a European continent living in peace. They were joined by those who thought that moving freely around on a continent deprived of borders and having a shared destiny was a natural evolution of things. Together, they would firmly defend the European idea, believing in the principle as such.
On the other hand were the people, then a minority, who could or would not see the advantages of a united Europe, who feared a loss of sovereignty or the loss of what they saw as their cultural identity. They resented decisions taken elsewhere than from their own country, by people other than their own governments. These so-called “Eurosceptics “ were mostly seen as the odd ones out, the conservative die-hard nationalists who were against progress and evolution and did not deserve much attention.
But then, probably starting somewhere in the mid-1990s, things evolved. It was not a single event that provoked the change; nor did it happen in one day. It was, on the contrary, a slow and gradual process that led to an entirely different perception of the European construction idea by its citizens. Several events contributed to that dramatic change:
- In 1994, Jacques Delors (France) arrived at the end of his mandate as president of the European Commission. He is often believed to have been the last president with a vision. After him, member states designated a series of presidents – Jacques Santer (Luxemburg), Romano Prodi (Italy) and Jose Manuel Barroso (Portugal) – often considered as too timid and lacking ambition and courage to have a real influence on Europe’s political agenda. Analysts here believe this is exactly why they had been designated by national governments in the first place: They wanted someone who would not be too ambitious nor too autonomous. The same spirit presided over the designation of Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy, and Herman van Rompuy, the president of the European Council.
- In 2004, the European Union had its biggest enlargement ever with 10 new countries joining at the same time. It included countries from Eastern Europe which had found back their sovereignty only recently and were not ready to transfer it to someone else; nor did they share the ambitions of the founding countries to deepen the European Union, preferring the idea of a loose, mostly economic, organization. Additionally, this huge enlargement made finding a consensus between member states more difficult, leading to even more vague compromises and considerably slowing down the decision-making process.
- With the accession of so many new countries, Germany and France, long considered as the steering “engine” of Europe, lost their influence on the European Union and the way to manage it. No longer able to impose their views and their vision, they lost considerable interest and went back to more national issues.
- Several institutional reforms (Maastricht Treaty in 1992, Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, Nice Treaty in 2001, Lisbon Treaty in 2007) made the Union functioning and architecture increasingly complicated and difficult to understand for the average citizen who generally has no idea of what competencies the EU has or doesn’t have, how it works, who decides on what and who is responsible for what. Additionally, more and more decisions are now taken outside the European democratic legislative process (i.e., European Council and European Parliament acting as co-legislators), with the Commission extending its executive powers; yet it is the least democratic institution of the EU since commissioners are designated by national governments and its huge administration (more than 33,000 staff members) doing most of the work outside any effective control.
- National politicians, faced with the necessity to adopt unpopular measures, often use the European Union as a scapegoat. “It’s Brussels” became an easy way out for national politicians confronted with criticism, forgetting all too conveniently that national governments themselves had been involved in the decision-making process at EU-level.
- As the idea of economic liberalization gained ground in Europe, the EU became more and more concerned with the competitiveness of European companies and the interests of industries; other issues, like migration, came to be seen in terms of security rather that human or social problems. The gap grew between the European institutions and European citizens who were more concerned about social issues, unemployment, poverty and health, to name a few.
The pros and cons
As a result, today, we still have those, ever fewer, decidedly in favor of the European Union as a principle, even though they don’t always know what it is all about, and those who are against it no matter what, for different reasons. In between the two, though, there is now an increasingly large number of European citizens who are not necessarily against the idea of a European Union as such, but want a different kind of Union: more democratic, more transparent, more accountable and, most of all, more concerned about its citizens and less about economic interests or big corporations.
They want a more humane and more equal Europe. They criticize the increasing power of political parties and of big economic interests and ask for better regulated financial markets. They want more resources for social programs: help for the jobless and the poor. They denounce the gradual erosion of their freedom of expression and the fact that media have renounced their power to control governments in order to serve as their mouthpiece instead. More recently, they denounced the fact that the EU spent millions to save banks but did not do anything for citizens struck by the crisis. There is a loss of faith in the Union as a project based on solidarity and respect for all.
Members states of the EU are bound by the Stability and Growth Pact, which consists of a fiscal monitoring of national governments. The Pact imposes a limit of 3 percent of GDP on the annual budget deficit and a limit of 60 percent of GDP on the national debt of member states. In practice, this may well limit a government’s spending when it does not have sufficient revenue. Social programs may hence be affected. And for most European citizens, the culprit is “Europe.” More generally, they blame an economic model, which they believe is promoted by the EU, that deteriorates social conditions.
Also part of the problem is the often shaky compromises member states reach to try and satisfy divergent opinions: To give but one example, in the framework of the Stability and Growth Pact, member states must adhere to strict fiscal discipline but at the same time, they have handed over part of their fiscal powers to the European Central Bank, thereby limiting their own margin of maneuver in this regard. Most member states have been in breach of the Pact for several years.
This category of people that criticizes the way Europe has evolved in the last years is often classified by politicians and media alike as being “Eurosceptic.” This is not only false; it is also a deliberate intent to avoid a much needed and long overdue discussion and reflection about what Europe is and what it wants to be. Indeed, the underlying idea, by dismissing these people as “anti-European,” is that it would be useless to try to convince them or make them change their mind. Hence, it is not worth talking with them.
In March, EU member states (with the exception of the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic which did not want to join) adopted a new Fiscal Compact to reinforce fiscal discipline. The next step, a much greater fiscal union, at least in the eurozone, is seen by some as a necessary solution to the European economic crisis. Germany is pushing hard for it. Is a fiscal union possible, though, without a closer political union? This is probably the first question that arises. But there is another, much more fundamental one that European leaders should be asking: Is this an economic model we want to keep? Clearly, for a majority of European citizens, the answer is no. It is time, then, for European leaders to pause and think about the way forward, taking into account the real concerns and interests of the European citizens. The economic crisis provides a unique opportunity for this. It should not be missed.