(MintPress)-A suicide attack last week in Helmand Province, the poppy-growing capital of the world, left four police officers dead and the chief injured, sending an important reminder to the United States that key to winning the “War on Terror” lies in the production of poppies.
While the poppies of the west are used to commemorate soldiers who have died in war, Afghanistan’s opium poppies have a very different meaning. Without poppies, the people would not survive – the flower, used to make opium and heroin, is considered the oil of Afghanistan.
Afghanistan produces 90 percent of the world’s illicit opium, bringing billions of dollars into the country, estimated to equal up to 20 percent of the country’s GDP. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates the 2011 export value of Afghanistan’s opium to be $2.4 billion, reaching a 133 percent increase in production value from the previous year.
Poppy cultivation emerged in Afghanistan in the 1990s following the destructive Soviet-Afghan war, which resulted in the collapse of the country’s agricultural production. When military operations in the countryside failed, the Soviets systematically destroyed agricultural resources, including orchards and irrigation canals, in hopes of forcing Afghans to migrate towards the cities where they could be more easily controlled.
As a result, Afghan farmers began the first systematic cultivation of opium poppy, which could produce high yields with little irrigation, fertilizer, or transportation because traders would pick up the crops directly from the farms. Today nearly 500,000 farming families, 20 percent of Afghans, survive on poppy farms – not to mention the drug manufacturers, middlemen and smugglers who are also involved in the illicit drug trade.
Two-thirds of the opium produced from Afghan poppy farms is refined into heroin, which reaps 10 times more profits than opium. There are 300-500 operating laboratories in the country, producing about 380-400 tons of heroin per year and exceeding the global demand according to the UNODC.
Poppy farmers, however, receive only a small percentage of the $4 billion dollars flowing into Afghanistan each year from the heroin industry. Farmers, who grow poppies out of desperation despite serious security risks, receive only 20 percent of the profits and are most susceptible to debt. The average farmer receives $2,500 annually, still more than most Afghans.
To enter the poppy industry, farmers take out loans from local smugglers who are eager to lend out seeds in exchange for a plentiful first crop. However, government efforts to eradicate the illicit drug trade have been known to destroy farms prior to harvest. Unable to repay loans, some farmers are forced to trade their children for debt forgiveness or seek protection from militant groups including the Taliban.
Opium Brides – smugglers, loans, violence, slavery
Fariba Nawa, Afghan-American journalist, wrote in her book “Opium Nation”, about a 12-year-old girl whose father gave her to a man 30 years her senior as repayment for his opium debts. Darya, as she was referred to in the book, is part of a growing trend of “opium brides,” who are subjected to sexual and emotional abuse after being forced to marry drug smugglers.
The practice of “loan brides” is not unique to the opium industry. Marrying girls at a young age, even as a means of settling land or monetary disputes, has been practiced in Afghanistan for centuries. Nawa explains that many poor households marry off their daughters early to relieve what they see as an economic burden.
“But those marriages are within family,” said Nawa, who believes that the issue of opium brides differs from the traditional practices. “Not many would promise their daughters to strangers from a completely different town, men with wives and families, who smuggle drugs and don’t speak their language,” she said, adding that the level and how many of these trades are being done is unprecedented inside Afghanistan right now.
“At its core, the problem of ‘opium brides’ and other ‘loan brides’ is one of human trafficking, and of the utter devaluing of women’s and girls’ lives,” says Una Moore, a Kabul-based development consultant who frequently works in Nangarhar Province, where opium eradication policies have been enforced. “Strip away the euphemisms and exoticism [of the terms] and you’re dealing with slavery.”
Girls who are enslaved by the drug smugglers are used as farm workers, drug manufacturers, sex slaves, maids and dancers to entertain the men. Many of these women have taken to self-immolation out of protest, desperation and suicide. The ministry of women’s affairs documented 103 cases of women who set themselves on fire between March 2009 and March 2010 in Afghanistan, however real numbers may be much higher due to the difficulties of collecting data in the country.
“Because many of these cases occur in the most dangerous and insular areas of the country, options for intervening on behalf of victims are virtually nonexistent,” says Moore. “That is a gruesome reality.”
Nawa says that, “The fathers who sell their daughters to settle their opium debts are ashamed of what they’re doing.” FRONTLINE corresponsent Najibullah Quraishi reported in his documentary, “Opium Brides“, on an Afghan man so wracked with guilt over giving away his children that he raised $20,000 U.S. dollars to buy them back. The man saved one of his children, but the other did not survive.
Most children are not as lucky. Even after these young girls, and sometimes boys, are given away as loan repayments, many families have no choice but to continue farming poppies.
Watch Opium Brides on PBS. See more from FRONTLINE.
Interests of the Taliban – security, support, money
In order to protect their crops, and their children, many families turn to the Taliban for protection against the government’s poppy eradication projects. According to the UNODC, the Taliban receives 10 percent of the total income made from poppies, roughly $400 million each year.
Areas under the protection of the Taliban can cultivate poppies without the risk of government intervention, therefore allowing farmers to harvest a plentiful crop, pay off debts and protect their families. Often times, the Taliban will plant landmines across poppy fields prior to an eradication attempt by government officials.
The Taliban did not always have a strong relationship with poppy farmers though. In 1994, the Taliban banned poppy cultivation on religious grounds, but they reversed the policy quickly in 1996 because of the backlash from key provinces like Kandahar and Helmand where warlords and farmers were staging rebellions.
In an attempt to garner international recognition and membership to the UN, the Taliban reinstated the poppy ban in 2000. So when the Taliban fell in 2001, they had little support from poppy farmers who felt alienated by economic misery.
In September 2001, the Taliban once again revoked the ban on poppy cultivation. Some analysts believe this was done to help finance the U.S.-Afghan war while others, like Dr. Vanda Felbab-Brown, a fellow at the Brookings Institution and a leading expert on drug interdiction efforts and counterinsurgency, believe the reversal was “driven by the political costs of the anti-drug policy.”
The Taliban has since provided security to poppy farmers in exchange for political capital in the battle against U.S. and local Afghan forces. However, the Taliban also charges protection and manufacturing fees and if farmers do find themselves in debt due to causes other than government-led poppy eradication, they may find themselves kidnapped by the Taliban or forced to give away their children regardless.
Government corruption and failed US policies
While Taliban fighters do offer security to poppy farmers, their presence can also increase the risk of violence in the region since local Afghan forces often make a concerted effort to attack farms with ties to the Taliban first.
A merchant in Helmand Province told the New York Times that last week’s suicide attack was meant to kill the police chief who was harsh towards poppy farmers with ties to the Taliban. “The police chief made a plan to eradicate the poppy fields of Taliban commanders first and then kill the poppy fields of those who are sympathetic with the Taliban, like landlords who help Taliban or those farmers whose sons or relatives are with Taliban,” said the merchant.
Some local government officials have been accused of selectively targeting farmers sympathetic to the Taliban while providing immunity to their own friends and families. A 2008 British study reported that many Afghans in the country’s south believe that state actors earn even greater profits from the drug trade than the insurgents.
General Abdul Raziq, Kandahar’s police chief, and Matiullah Khan, head of a private army in Uruzgan province, are both alleged to be very important drug traffickers. Gul Agha Shirzai, provincial governor in Nangarhar Province, has also been accused of suppressing poppy cultivation simply to garner international support while eliminating drug competition from his own production trafficking ring.
It is widely known among the Afghan people that the government’s eradication policies are ineffective. A 2011 study by the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) found a unanimous anger towards the government from farmers whose fields were destroyed.
One farmer said, “I lost my poppy, I don’t have food, I don’t have bread for my children, I don’t have money. This government is my enemy.” Another reported, “After the suicide attack, the eradication team were afraid to come here. The Taliban does not allow them to come here.”
A 2009 study by the U.S. Institute of Peace found that “It is no longer possible to treat the insurgency and the drug trade as separate matters, to be handled by military and law enforcement, respectively.” The report acknowledged the relationship between Taliban fighters and poppy farmers and encouraged NATO and Afghan forces to put more emphasis on attacking major drug traffickers and labs while finding alternative economic opportunities for local Afghan poppy farmers.
The United States did not become active in poppy eradication until 2004; previously, the U.S. employed Northern Alliance warlords, who were wealthy in opium poppy, to fight the Taliban and provide intelligence. From 2004-2008, the U.S. expanded its operations to include poppy eradication. International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), the NATO-led security mission in Afghanistan, did not directly engage in eradication, but instead provided security to government employees as they cleared the fields.
When the U.S. and ISAF realized that its poppy policies were sparking support for the Taliban, the U.S. decided to defund the central eradication force and take a step back. while continuing to assist local forces, which pursue poppy eradication in order to garner international supporters who wish to crack down on the illicit drug trade – similar to the Taliban’s attempts to gain international recognition in the late 1990s.
Finding sustainable solutions
Not all of the Afghan and ISAF efforts to eradicate the country’s poppy problem have been in vain. Foreign Affairs reports that there are fewer provinces cultivating poppy today than in 2007, when a record 8,000 tons of opium were produced.
The AREU found that government-led efforts to eradicate farms while finding alternative livelihoods for farmers were particularly successful in areas closer to an urban center with a more established, permanent police presence. In urban areas, the study found a growing demand for crop diversification, more employment and trade opportunities are available, and there is more security and access to education and health services.
The study also found that poppy eradication is least sustainable in communities further from the cities, where there is a lack of viable alternatives. And finding a viable alternative to poppy cultivation can be very difficult, given that in 2011, farmers could make 11 times more growing opium than wheat – the largest disparity since 2003.
It will take several decades for Afghanistan to transition off of opium. In the meantime, analysts agree that steps must be taken to protect young boys and girls from becoming caught in the crossfire. International and local communities should focus on helping pay off poppy debts while providing alternate opportunities for economic prosperity.
Paying off poppy debts, however, will not stop the illicit opium trade. Felbab-Brown suggests that ISAF focus on interdiction policies in pursuit of Taliban-linked traffickers and money flows should be better tracked to curb corruption and identify powerful warlords. Countries with large opium and heroin consumption should also focus on treatment and prevention programs to minimize demand.
As for the children sold to smugglers and debt-collectors, efforts must be taken to raise awareness about human rights and encourage dialogue on the taboo topic. “A well-trained and courageous team of social workers needs to be mentored to maturity, protected by honest police and backed up by a judicial system that adheres to international human right law,” says Moore, adding, “Victims must be offered safe haven in shelters that are not under constant threat from the most conservative and misogynist elements within the government. Afghanistan today is a far cry from any of that.”
Felbab-Brown, who focuses on the national security implications of illicit economies, affirms that “any counternarcotics policy — whether [overbearing] eradication regardless of the political fallout or rural development efforts — ultimately require[s] good and sustained security.”